The core of each IAFM task force revolves around a two-ship element consisting of an aviation ship (CV55 in the CVCOM, CVL-150 in the SAGCOM) and an SC-150 cruiser. Most navy missions benefit greatly from having an aviation ship at their core, even a limited one like the 15-20,000t CVL-150, and everyone benefits from a high-end IAMD missile cruiser. Consider the number of helicopter sorties per day required just for ASW. From the CNA's report entitled " Future Helicopter Force Requirements Analysis ". CNA - Pg 28 When a separate task force also has to contend with Surface Warfare in addition to ASW, and has no supporting assets like P-3s, the number of helicopters needed in the task force could go up to 27 H-60R/ Ss or more, 19 MH-60Rs and 8 that can be either Rs or Ss. If the number of false contacts is high, or sonar conditions are poor, the number of helicopters needed could be twice that. CNA - Pg 38 Assuming external assets like P-3s and TACAIR are available, the
Showing posts from October, 2020
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Table of Contents Introduction Fleet Architecture Key Concepts Bimodal Presence and Maneuver Forces New Task Force Types Ship Types Aviation CV55 CVL-150 Subsurface Combatant SSK Large Combatants SC-150 FPD-150 FMG-150 Small Combatants LCK Logistics &Auxiliary This version of the IAFM is sized to correspond to the Navy's Battle Force 2045 and "355" fleet designs. As such, it is more expensive than our existing fleet design, or the recent Hudson fleet design. The IAFM is broken down into categories of ships: Aviation, Subsurface Combatants, Large Combatants, Small Combatants, and Logistics & Auxiliaries. Each section lists the steady-state count of each ship type, a notional "First In Class" cost, a discounted unit cost that applies a learn factor and build rate discount to generate an average cost, a service life of each ship in the class, and the resulting build rate. I also include a notes column that describes roughly what each type of ship is. A
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Introduction Every few years, there's an effort to revisit the design of the US Navy fleet in light of changes in technology, geopolitics, and budget realities. I decided to take a stab at a fleet design myself. As part of this effort, I reviewed a number of recent fleet designs from the Navy and various think tanks. Obviously, with this type of exercise there's a healthy chance of "garbage in/garbage out". I attempted to apply my cost model equally and impartially, to all fleet designs studied, but some subjectivity is inevitable. The costs of non-existent ship designs is highly subjective. This has a major, downstream impact on the overall fleet numbers and design. YMMV. I developed a pricing methodology that attempted to take into account ship construction costs, O&S, manning, munitions in VLS cells and aircraft. I used a planning budget that roughly corresponds to the cost of the Navy's "355 fleet" using my pricing methodology.