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Lockheed Martin VARIOUS Introduction Armed UAVs and loitering munitions play an increasing role in warfare.  UAVs are typically classified into five Groups, by size range. Fixed-wing UAVs above Group 3 usually require a runway.  This limits their ability to generate sorties when their operating area is not in close proximity to the airfield.  Transit to and from the airfield is a significant factor in the overall sortie time. Rotary-wing aircraft like the MQ-8C Fire Scout or smaller UAVs like STUAS can sortie from areas closer to their operating area and return to Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs), to shorten their turn around times between sorties.  However, they are vulnerable to all manner of air defenses and don't carry very much. MQ-8C Fire Scout STUAS UAV-based Armed ISR and Close Air Support requires larger, fixed-wing UAVs like the Army's MQ-1C Grey Eagle and USAF's MQ-9 Reaper, but they need a long runway. What's needed is a Group 4, armed UAV that ca

  The core of each IAFM task force revolves around a two-ship element consisting of an aviation ship (CV55 in the CVCOM, CVL-150 in the SAGCOM) and an SC-150 cruiser.  Most navy missions benefit greatly from having an aviation ship at their core, even a limited one like the 15-20,000t CVL-150, and everyone benefits from a high-end IAMD missile cruiser. Consider the number of helicopter sorties per day required just for ASW. From the CNA's report entitled " Future Helicopter Force Requirements Analysis ". CNA - Pg 28 When a separate task force also has to contend with Surface Warfare in addition to ASW, and has no supporting assets like P-3s, the number of helicopters needed in the task force could go up to 27 H-60R/ Ss or more, 19 MH-60Rs and 8 that can be either Rs or Ss.  If the number of false contacts is high, or sonar conditions are poor, the number of helicopters needed could be twice that. CNA - Pg 38 Assuming external assets like P-3s and TACAIR are available, the

Table of Contents Introduction Fleet Architecture Key Concepts Bimodal Presence and Maneuver Forces New Task Force Types Ship Types Aviation CV55 CVL-150 Subsurface Combatant SSK Large Combatants SC-150 FPD-150 FMG-150 Small Combatants LCK Logistics &Auxiliary This version of the IAFM is sized to correspond to the Navy's Battle Force 2045 and "355" fleet designs.  As such, it is more expensive than our existing fleet design, or the recent Hudson fleet design. The IAFM is broken down into categories of ships: Aviation, Subsurface Combatants, Large Combatants, Small Combatants, and Logistics & Auxiliaries.  Each section lists the steady-state count of each ship type, a notional "First In Class" cost, a discounted unit cost that applies a learn factor and build rate discount to generate an average cost, a service life of each ship in the class, and the resulting build rate.  I also include a notes column that describes roughly what each type of ship is.   A

Introduction Every few years, there's an effort to revisit the design of the US Navy fleet in light of changes in technology, geopolitics, and budget realities.  I decided to take a stab at a fleet design myself. As part of this effort, I reviewed a number of recent fleet designs from the Navy and various think tanks. Obviously, with this type of exercise there's a healthy chance of "garbage in/garbage out".   I attempted to apply my cost model equally and impartially, to all fleet designs studied, but some subjectivity is inevitable.  The costs of non-existent ship designs is highly subjective.  This has a major, downstream impact on the overall fleet numbers and design. YMMV. I developed a pricing methodology that attempted to take into account ship construction costs, O&S, manning, munitions in VLS cells and aircraft.  I used a planning budget that roughly corresponds to the cost of the Navy's "355 fleet" using my pricing methodology.

The USMC is moving away from large-scale amphibious assaults towards smaller, battalion-and-below formations and EABO.  However, the US Military may still find itself in need of performing such an assault as part of a broader forcible-entry operation. What’s needed is a “relatively” inexpensive way to land a large, mobile, armored force in short order.   So how about give the large-scale amphibious assault mission to the Army?  Switch three IBCTs (roughly a division) over to an Amphibious Assault Brigade Combat Team (AABCT), an organization mirroring the SBCT, but replacing the ~300 Strykers with the USMC ACV. USMC ACV with 30mm Remote Turret SBCT Organization ( CBO ) SBCT Organization Pg 2 In this way, existing, land-based SBCT doctrine and training could remain the same.  The AABCT can be used in more or less the same ways and same situations as an SBCT.  ACVs are somewhat heavier and larger than Strykers so the logistics elements in the SBCT will need a bit of a bump. Outfitting the